Categories provide a coarse grained description of the world. A fundamental question is whether categories simply mirror an underlying structure of nature, or instead come from the complex interactions of human beings among themselves and with the environment. Here we address this question by modelling a population of individuals who co-evolve their own system of symbols and meanings by playing elementary language games. The central result is the emergence of a hierarchical category structure made of two distinct levels: a basic layer, responsible for fine discrimination of the environment, and a shared linguistic layer that groups together perceptions to guarantee communicative success. Remarkably, the number of linguistic categories turns out to be finite and small, as observed in natural languages.
in very different ways, but they need to align their linguistic ontologies in order to understand each other.
In the past there have been many computational and mathematical studies addressing the learning procedures for form-meaning associations [16] [17] . From the point of view of methodology, the evolutionary scheme, based on the maximization of some fitness functions, has been extensively applied [18, 19] . Recent years, however, have shown that also the orthogonal approach of self-organisation can be fruitfully exploited in multi-agent models for the emergence of language [6] [7] [8] . In this context, a community of language users is viewed as a complex dynamical system which has to develop a shared communication system [20, 21] . In this debate, a still open problem concerns the emergence of a small number of forms out of a diverging number of meanings. For example the few "basic colour terms", present in natural languages, coarse-grain an almost infinite number of perceivable different colours [22] [23] [24] .
Following this recent line of research, our work shows that an assembly of individuals with basic communication rules and without any external supervision, may evolve an initially empty set of categories, achieving a non-trivial communication system characterized by a few linguistic categories. To probe the hypothesis that cultural exchange is sufficient to this extent, individuals in our model are never replaced (as in evolutionary schemes [18, 19] ), the only evolution occurring in their internal formmeaning association tables, i.e. their "mind". The individuals play elementary language games [25, 26] whose rules, hard-wired in individuals, constitute the only knowledge initially shared by the population. They are also capable of perceiving analogical stimuli and communicating with each others [6, 7] . . The speaker discriminates the scene and names one object and the hearer tries to guess the named object. A correct guess makes the game successful.
Based on game's outcomes both individuals update their category boundaries and the inventory of the associated words. A detailed description of the game is given in Fig. 1 . A resume of the main results of our experiments is given in Fig. 2 . The evolution of the population presents two main stages: 1) a phase where players do not understand each other, followed by 2) a phase where communication has reached full success thanks to . The two new categories inherit the words-inventory of the parent perceptual category (here the words "green" and "olive") along with a different brand new word each ("brown" and "blue"). Then the speaker browses the list of words associated to the perceptual category containing the topic. There are two possibilities: if a previous successful communication has occurred with this category, the last winning word is chosen; otherwise the last created word is selected. In the present example the speaker chooses the word "brown", and transmits it to the hearer. The outcome of the game is a failure since the hearer does not have the word "brown" in her inventory. The speaker unveils the topic, in a non-linguistic way (e.g. pointing at it), and the hearer adds the new word to the word inventory of the corresponding category. In game 2 the speaker chooses the topic "a", finds the topic already discriminated and verbalizes it using the word "green" (which, for example, may be the winning word in the last successful communication concerning that category). The hearer knows this word and therefore points correctly to the topic. This is a successful game: both the speaker and the hearer eliminate all competing words for the perceptual category containing the topic, leaving "green" only. In general when ambiguities are present (e.g. the hearer finds the verbalized word associated to more than one category containing an object), these are solved making an unbiased random choice.
the context of the ``naming game'' (an individual object to be named), has been already studied [8] , and a similar evolution was observed and explained. All individuals, when necessary, create new words with zero probability of repetition: this leads to an initial growth of the vocabulary associated to each perceptual category. New words are spread through the population in later games and, whenever a word is understood by both players, other competing words for the same category are forgotten. This eventually leads to only one word per category. During the growth of the dictionary the success rate, see Fig. 2b , is very small. The subsequent reduction of the dictionary corresponds to a growing success rate which reaches its maximum value after synonymy has disappeared. In all our numerical experiments the final success rate overcomes 80% and in most of them goes above 90%, weakly increasing with the final number of perceptual categories. Success is reached in a number of games per player of the order , grows sub-logarithmically and for many practical purposes it can be considered constant.
The success rate is expected to depend on the alignment of the category inventory among different individuals. The degree of alignment of category boundaries is measured by an overlap function O (defined in the Appendix) which returns a value proportional to the degree of alignment of the two category inventories, reaching its maximum unitary value when they exactly coincide. Its study, see dashed curves of The answer has to be found in the analysis of polysemy, i.e. the existence of perceptual categories identified by the same unique word. Misalignment, in fact, induces a ``word contagion'' phenomenon. With a small but non zero probability, two individuals with similar, but not exactly equal, category boundaries, may play a game with a topic falling in a misalignment gap, as represented in Fig. 3a . In this way a word is copied to an adjacent perceptual category and, through a second occurrence of a similar event, may become the unique name of that category. Interfering events may occur in between: it is always possible, in fact, that a game is played with a topic object falling in the bulk of the category, where both players agree on its old name, therefore cancelling the contagion. With respect to this cancelling probability, some gaps are too small and act as almost perfectly aligned boundaries, drastically reducing the probability of any further contagion. Thus, polysemy needs a two-step process to emerge, and a global self-organised agreement to become stable. On the other hand, polysemy guarantees (solid curves), grows together with cat n during the first stage (where communicative success is still lacking), then decreases and stabilises to a much lower value. Some configurations of both category layers, at a time such that the success rate has overcome 95%, are presented in Fig. 4 , using different sets of external stimuli.
The analysis, resumed in Fig.3b, of With the help of an extensive and systematic series of simulations we have shown that a simple negotiation scheme, based on memory and feedback, is sufficient to guarantee the emergence of a self-organised communication system which is able to discriminate objects in the world, requiring only a small set of words. Individuals alone are endowed with the ability of forming perceptual categories, while cultural interaction among them is responsible for the emergence and alignment of linguistic categories. Our model reproduces a typical feature of natural languages: despite a very high resolution power, the number of linguistic categories is very small. For instance, in many human languages, the number of "basic colour terms" used to categorize colours usually amounts to about ten [22] [23] [24] , while the light spectrum resolution power of our eyes is evidently much higher. Note that in our simulations we observe a reduction, with time, 
Appendix
The degree of alignment of category boundaries is measured by the following ``overlap'' O function: from the prototype [7] , are exactly equivalent to our ``rigid boundaries'' categories.
Moreover, all the results of our experiment can be easily generalized to multidimensional perceptual channels, provided an appropriate definition of category domains is given. It should be kept in mind that the goal of our work is to investigate why the continuum of perceivable meanings in the world is organized, in language, in a finite and small number of subsets with different names, with a no immediate (objective) cause for a given partition with respect to other infinite possibilities. Apart from the evident example of the partition of the continuous light spectrum in a small number of "basic color terms", this phenomenon is widespread in language: one can ask, for example, what objective differences allow to distinguish a cup from a glass; one can present a multi-dimensional continuum of objects able to "contain a liquid"
(including also objects given as a prize), but a natural discontinuity between cups and glasses does not appear; our model, even reducing the phenomenon to the case of a 1-dimensional continuum, unveils a mechanism which can be easily extended to any kind of space, once it has been provided with a topology. The mechanism we propose for the discrete partition in linguistic subsets (categories) does not depend on the exact nature of this topology, which is of course a fundamental, yet different, matter of investigation.
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